State liability for police action with specific reference to Minister of Police v Rabie 1986 (1) SA 117 (A) by Negota, Khakhathi Samuel
STATE LIABILITY FOR POLICE ACTION WITH SPECIFIC REFERENCE TO 
MINISTER OF POLICE V RABIE 1986 (1) SA 117 (A) 
BY 
KHAKHATHI SAMUEL NEGOTA 
Dissertation submitted in part fulfilment of the requirements for 
the degree of 
0 {..!) 
ril 
z 
C() 
1.0 
0 
N 
lO 
lO 
""" C"') 
MASTER OF LAWS 
in the subject 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA 
SUPERVISOR PROFESSOR Y.M. BURNS 
FEBRUARY 1995 
I I  Ill/ /Ill Ill I IIIII/ II /Ill I I II 
01596114 
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PARAGRAPH 
A. 
B. 
c. 
Summary 
Introduction 
Historical development of 
State Liability 
{i) Roman-Dutch Law 
{ii) English Law 
South African Law 
{i) Legislation 
{ii) The theoretical basis of state 
liability 
iii-iv 
1 
1 
1-2 
2 
3 
3-4 
4-6 
D. The judicial approach to the limitation of state 
liability for police action 
{i) oThe "Control test" 
{ii) The principle of fault 
E. Minister of Police v Rabie 1986{1) 
SA 117 {A) 
F. The views of legal commentators on the 
Rabie decision 
G. Case law after the Rabie decision 
H. The Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa Act 200 of 1993 
I. Conclusion 
J. List of Abbreviations 
K. Table of Cases 
6 
6-10 
10-11 
11-17 
17-18 
19-23 
23-24 
25-28 
29 
30-31 
ii 
L. Table of Statutes 
M. Bibliography 
N. Index 
r::~,.:;·: .·. -·-.:~-·· 
,~~~ -tn- :> r 
Class 
Klas 
Ac~es 345.520 68 NEGO 
Aanwin ............ . 
il~lllllllllll~llllllllllllllllll 
01596114 
32 
33 
34-37 
iii 
SUMMARY 
This study sought to make a detailed discussion of 
state liability for police action with specific 
reference to the case of Minister of Police v Rabie 
1986 (1) SA 117 (A). The historical development of 
state liability was traced from Roman-Dutch Law, 
through English Law up to and including South African 
Law. 
The major part of this work has been devoted to an in-
depth discussion of the case of Minister of Police v 
Rabie 1986 (1) S.A. 117 (A), which is the modern locus 
classicus on state liability for police action in 
South Africa. In this case the risk principle appears 
to have been expressly incorporated into South African 
law. This is the principle which postulates that the 
injured party should be compensated even if there was 
no fault on the part of the wrongdoer. 
During the course of this study a brief discussion of 
case law that followed the Rabie decision was also 
made. The risk principle adopted in the Rabie case was 
rejected and subjected to severe criticism, These 
decisions suggested the application of the traditional 
standard test which places emphasis on the question of 
whether the policeman's acts were done within the 
course and scope of his employment. The case of 
iv 
Minister of Law and Order v Ngobo 1992 (4) SA 822 (A) 
was even bold enough to reject the principle on the 
basis that it is controversial and untried. 
The drastic inroad made by certain sections of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 
of 1993 into this field of study was also 
acknowledged. It was submitted that in the light of 
this new law, the members of the police force as 
protectors of individual rights will in future have to 
be carefully chosen, screened, trained and constantly 
supervised in order to minimise the number of claims 
against the state based on damages. 
It was finally accepted that in so far as the test for 
vicarious liability is concerned, the Appellate 
Division in Ngobo 's case has, by reverting to the 
application of the traditional standard test, 
overruled its previous decision in the Rabie case. It 
was submitted that an uncertainty in the law has been 
created by these conflicting decisions and legislative 
intervention is therefore warranted. 
1 Supra 
STATE LIABILITY FOR POLICE ACTION WITH SPECIFIC 
REFERENCE TO MINISTER OF POLICE V RABIE 1986(1) SA 
117 (A) . 
A. Introduction 
In this treatise a detailed discussion of state 
liability for police action will be made with specific 
reference to the case of Minister of Police v Rabie1 
which is the leading case in this regard. A 
discussion of this case will be preceded by a short 
historical development of state liability. A short 
discussion of the relevant sections of the new South 
African Constitution2 will also be given. 
B. Historical development of state liability 
(i) Roman-Dutch law 
As Roman-Dutch law forms part of South African common 
law, a discussion of historical development of any 
branch of South African law is incomplete without 
reference to the Roman-Dutch law. During the 
Republican era administrative powers were fairly 
extensive and, contrary to the trend in England, 
judicial control over the administration was 
diminishing. This was due to the fact that the sphere 
2 Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 200 of 1993. 
2 
of politics (politie) was increasing at the expense of 
matters of justice (justitie). As a result the Dutch 
trend was away from rather than towards judicial 
review of adminitrative action3 • 
(ii) English Law 
In England the maxim "the king can do no wrong" 
applied to delictual actions, with the result that the 
Crown was immune from legal process. As a result 
neither the king, his ministers nor his officials 
could be sued in tort (for delictual acts). However, 
although the Crown was not liable in tort, the 
injured party 
servants. 4 
could sue the particular Crown 
The position changed with the Crown Proceedings Act of 
1947. 5 In terms of this Act the Crown is subject to 
the same general liability in tort as that of a 
private person of full age and capacity. The Crown 
was therefore placed in the same position as that of 
an ordinary defendant. 6 
3 See Baxter L, Administrative Law (1984) 22-24. 
4 See HWR Wade and CF Forsyth, Administrative Law (1994) 819-825. 
5 Act 10 of 1947. 
6 See section 2 of Act 10 of 1947. 
3 
C. South African Law 
(i) Legislation 
Before the introduction of the State Liability Act of 
19107 our courts applied the English principle of 
immunity- " the king can do no wrong." 8 It is of 
interest to note that in 1994, in the case of S.v. 
Gqozo9 the Ciskei General Division found that the 
English common law principle- " the king can do no 
wrong" - did not, and still does not, form part of the 
common law of the Republic of South Africa subsequent 
to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
Act 32 of 1961, and hence did not form part of the law 
of (the then) Ciskei. 
The Act of 1910 was followed by the State Liability 
Act of 1957. 10 
Section 1 of the Act reads as follows : 
against the State which would, if that 
"Any claim 
claim had 
arisen against a person, be the ground of an action in 
any competent court, shall be cognizable by such 
court, whether the claim arises out of any contract 
7 Act 1 of 1910. 
8 See Binda v Colonial Government (1887) 5 Sc 284. 
9 1994 (2) S.A. 756, CK GO. 
10 Act 20 of 1957. 
4 
lawfully entered into on behalf of the state or out of 
any wrong committed by any servant of the state acting 
in his capacity and within the scope of his authority 
as such servant" . 
Although section 1 refers to contract and delict only, 
the courts have found that state liability is not 
confined to claims arising from contract and delict 
only. For example, the state may be liable in terms 
of the actio de pauperie. 11 
(ii) The theoretical basis of state liability. 
The courts have expressly stated that there is no 
difference between the position of the state and its 
servants and that of master and servant in private 
law . 12 In order to bring the master's vicarious 
liability within the general principle of fault in 
private law, some or other culpa in eligendo is 
presumed on the part of the master. However, Wiechers 
points out that working with the presumption of fault 
in the form of culpa in eligendo is inappropriate 
because it is virtually impossible to establish who 
was responsible for the negligent employment of the 
particular person. He suggests the adoption of the 
11 See Union Government v Farr 1913 CPD 818. 
12 See BSA v Crickmore 1921 AD 107. 
5 
risk principle as a basis for liability. 13 
The problem inherent in attempting to find a 
theoretical basis for state liability is well set out 
in Feldman (pty) Limited v Mall where the court points 
out that law is not always logical. 14 
In an attempt to find a theoretical basis for state 
liability for administrative action, reliance has also 
been placed on the risk principle. 15 Generally, this 
principle postulates that the injured party should be 
compensated even if there was no fault on the part of 
the wrongdoer. The principle has however recent 
been subjected to severe criticism. 16 
In some instances the state does compensate subjects 
who have suffered loss as a result of dangerous 
activity on the part of the state, without fault on 
the part of the servants of the state being proved, 
where legislative provision has been made for 
13 M Wiechers, Administrative Law (1984) 307-309. 
14 
"But law is not always logical; on the very question underlying this 
liability, viz; the reason why a master should ever be liable for 
acts of the servant which are committed in disregard of his express 
instruction, judges and commentators have found difficulty in finding 
a logically satisfying basis, and the way in which the rule has been 
applied is probably a compromise between conflicting considerations." 
1945 AD 733 at 799. 
15 This is commonly known as liability without fault. Writers such as 
Baxter L, Op cit, use the term "strict liability." 
16 See for example Minister of Law and Order v Ngobo 1992 (4) S.A. 
882 (A). 
6 
compensation. 17 
D. The judicial approach to the limitation of state 
liability for police action. 
(i) The "control test" 
It is a well-known fact that the police generally 
exercise their functions in emergency situations, and 
for this reason it has always been found necessary to 
limit the liability of the state for police action. 
Thus, in determining the requirements for state 
liability, the courts have firstly relied on the model 
of the private service relationship, but have also 
required that the policeman in question acted in his 
capacity as a servant of the state and acted within 
the scope of his authority. In other words a decisive 
factor was whether the state could control the servant 
at the time when he performed the wrongful act. This 
approach by the courts, dubbed the "control test" has 
been applied in a number of cases. 18 
The early locus classicus on state liability is the 
case of Union Government v Thorne19 in which the 
17 See for example section 65 of the Electricity Act 40 of 1958 and 
section 70 of the South African Transport Services Act 65 of 1981. 
18 See Union Government v Thorne 1930 AD 47, Sibiya v Swart 1950 (4) S .A. 
515 (A) and Dames v De Kock 1958 (1) S.A. 773 (E). 
19 Supra. 
7 
court held that the state is liable for the acts of 
the police because all members of the police force are 
prima facie servants of the Crown. 
In Sibiya v Swart20 the plaintiff was arrested by a 
constable, who unlawfully assaulted him, causing him 
severe injury. The court found that where an assault 
takes place while a servant of the state is performing 
a statutory duty, which does not depend on the 
exercise of a discretion, that wrong falls within the 
meaning of the Act, and was committed by a servant of 
the state acting in his capacity and within the scope 
of his authority as such servant. 
The outcome of this case is that the court adopted the 
view that an official who is permitted by statute or 
common law to exercise a discretion, does not act in 
his capacity as a servant of the state when exercising 
that discretion. In other words the exercise of the 
discretionary power removes him from the control of 
the state, which means that the state is accordingly 
not liable in delict. 
In the case of Naidoo en Andere v Minister van 
Polisie. 21 Hiemstra AJP discussed the question of the 
liability of the state for unlawful arrest executed by 
20 Supra. 
21 1976 (4) S.A. 954 (T). 
8 
its servants. Hiemstra rejected the approach laid 
down in the Sibiya case, holding that the position has 
been altered by section 5 of the Police Act 7 of 
1958. 22 
The judge found as follows 
"Dit is, met eerbied, intens moeilik om in hierdie 
bepaling te lees dat oral waar 'n polisiebeampte sy 
eie diskresie gebruik, die Staat nie aanspreeklik is 
nie, net omdat hy nie op die oomblik direk onder 
beheer van die Staat was nie. Hy is trouens in my 
oordeel altyd, wanneer hy met polisiewerk besig is, 
onder beheer van sy meerderes en gevolglik onder 
beheer van die Staat." 2 3 
The judge rejected the contention that a policeman 
executes a "personal duty" when arresting a person as 
opposed to a statutory duty when he is investigating 
the alleged crime. Hiemstra therefore found that 
since the inclusion of article 5 of the Police Act, a 
policeman is always under the control of his 
superiors. He accordingly upheld the plaintiff's 
claim and awarded damages to all three plaintiffs. 
22 The section reads as follows : 
"5. The functions of the South African Police shall be, inter alia, 
(a) the preservation of the internal security of the Union; 
(b) the maintenance of law and order; 
(c) the investigation of any offence or alleged offence and 
(d) the prevention of crime." 
23 At 957 of the report. 
9 
By contrast Boshoff J did not follow the Naidoo case 
in the Transvaal Provincial Division case of Mhlongo 
v Minister of Police24 and refused to award damages 
to the plaintiff. He found that in effecting the 
arrest, the policeman was performing an act of 
personal nature, (in which he had exercised a personal 
discretion) , and that the act was therefore not 
performed by him as a servant of the State, acting in 
his and within the scope of his authority as such 
servant. 
The matter then came before the Appellate Division25 
where it was found that in performing their duties 
policemen are prima facie servants of the state, and 
that the exercise of a discretionary power does not 
necessarily take them out of that category of 
servants. 
The court set out the state of the law regarding 
delictual wrongs committed by policemen, as follows : 
* all members of the police force are prima facie 
servants of the state. 
* a wrongful act committed by a member of the force in 
the course of his employment renders the state prima 
24 1977 (2) S.A. 800 (T). A policeman, in attempting to arrest a 
certain Bhengu, negligently shot and killed a certain Mhlongo. 
The deceased's customary union partner claimed damages from the State. 
25 1978 (2) S.A. 551 (A). 
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facie liable. 
* the state must then show that the policeman was 
exercising a duty which took him out of the category 
of servant pro hac vice and to do this, the state 
must show that the duty is of a personal nature in 
the sense that the state could not control him. 
* the essential criterion is whether the state or the 
employer can direct or control the servant in the 
exercise of his duty or function, which includes the 
exercise of a discretion. 
In Minister van Polisie en Andere v Gamble en 
Andere26 the court had the opportunity of deciding 
upon the question of the State's liability for an 
unlawful arrest. 
police officer 
The Appellate Division found that a 
is always under the command, 
supervision and control of his seniors and thus under 
the control of the state, when he is conducting police 
business. 
(ii) The principle of fault 
Wiechers27 suggests that the limitation to the scope 
and ambit of state liability be sought in the 
requirement of fault. This would mean that a 
policeman who negligently arrests a person without a 
26 1979 (4) S .A. 759 (A) . 
27 Op cit, 336. 
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warrant will not render the State liable, since it is 
not expedient from the perspective of legal policy, 
(for example because of the nature of police fuctions) 
to hold the State liable for negligent arrests. 
On the other hand negligent detention, where the 
element of necessity and urgency is lacking, should 
render the state liable. 28 
McKerron29 has however a different opinion 
altogether. According to him for an action of false 
imprisonment or illegal arrest to lie it is not 
necessary that the defendant should act maliciously; 
it is sufficient that the arrest should be illegal. 
It is however, Wiechers' approach which seems to have 
the support of earlier case law. 30 
E. Minister of Police v Rabie 1986(1) S.A. 117 (A) 
The risk principle appears to have been incorporated 
into our law via the decision in Minister of Police v 
Rabie. 31 In this case an off-duty policeman, one Van 
29 Ibid. 
29 Mckerron RG, The Law of Delict (1971) 160. 
30 In Bhika v Minister of Justice 1965 (4) S.A. 399 (W) the court implied 
that minimal fault displayed by a policeman in a case of wrongful 
arrest and detention influences the amount to be awarded as damages. 
See also the case of Solomon v Visser 1972 (2) S.A 327 (C) and Donono 
v Minister of Prisons 1973 (4) S.A. 259 (C) for detention arising from 
callous disregard for the rights and freedoms of the plaintiff. 
31 Supra. 
12 
der Westhuizen, who was employed as a mechanic in the 
police force, assaulted, arrested and detained the 
respondent, and caused a charge to be laid against 
him. Vander Westhuizen's duties centred on repairing 
police vehicles and he only worked during normal 
office hours. It was common cause that at the time of 
the assault he was dressed in private clothing, he was 
driving his private vehicle, and he was at the scene 
of the assault in pursuance of private interests. 
Respondent alleged that Van der Westhuizen was at all 
times acting in his capacity as a policeman in the 
employ of the South African Police, and that he was 
acting within the course and scope of his employment. 
(In the court a quo it was found that Van der 
Westhuizen had acted as a servant of the state and 
that the appellant was vicariously liable for the 
damages suffered by the respondent. The defendants 
were ordered to pay damages for assault, unlawful 
arrest, wrongful detention and malicious prosecution). 
In the Appellate Division the majority found (Van 
Heerden JA dissenting) that 
" the cardinal question is whether the respondent has 
proved that Van der Westhuizen was acting in the 
course or scope of his employment as a servant of the 
state, ie whether he was doing the state's work, viz 
police work, when he committed the wrongs in question. 
13 
In this regard the state is in no better position than 
any other employer. (It would seem that instances of 
a policeman momentarily ceasing to be a servant pro 
hac vice because of eg, an exercise of discretion, if 
they do occur at all, are now exceptional) . 32 
Jansen JA identified two facets of the enquiry, 
namely 
(a) What was the scope of Vander Westhuizen's 
employment, and 
(b) What was the relation of the act done by Van der 
Westhuizen to the functions he had to carry out. 
In examining the functions of the police as set out in 
section 5 of the Police Act, he found that they 
include the making of an arrest; taking of the 
arrested person to the charge office and charging him 
with an alleged offence. 
"Whereas Vander Westhuizen's work as a mechanic was 
limited as to time and place, his work as a policeman 
was not so circumscribed. In the absence of specific 
instruction to the contrary (and none have been 
brought to our attention} he could at any time and at 
any place embark on the discharge of his police 
functions. In certain circumstances, it might even 
have been his duty to do so but in others it would 
32 Op cit 132. 
14 
have been a matter of discretion." 33 
In so far as the second facet is concerned the 
judge34 found that at the time and place in question 
Van der Westhuizen was dressed in private clothing. 
He was in his private vehicle in Malvern and on the 
scene in pursuance of private interests. According to 
the judge these circumstances did not per se exclude 
the possibility of his having then embarked upon 
police work. Van der Westhuizen could at any time, 
decide to proceed as a policeman if the circumstances 
so required. 
Since he professed to act as a policeman and 
identified.himself as a policeman when effecting the 
arrest the court found that it was a fair inference 
that van der Westhuizen intended throughout to act as 
a policeman in the sense that he intended to exercise 
his authority as a policeman. This, according to the 
judge, was further evidenced by Van der Westhuizen's 
telling the Divisional Commissioner of Police that he 
had considered himself as being on duty at the time of 
the assault. 
Although the questioning of a suspect, arresting him 
and taking him to the police station to be charged as 
33 Op cit 133. 
34 Op cit 133. 
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a suspect would normally fall within police functions, 
the judge, after analysing the facts and examining the 
evidence, found that Van der Westhuizen was totally 
self-serving and had acted mala fide. Van der 
Westhuizen knew from the beginning that the respondent 
was innocent and that there were no grounds for using 
his powers as a policeman. 
Since Van der Westhuizen was actuated by malice 
(evident from the assaults and the false charge) it 
was clear that Van der Westhuizen had not in reality 
performed any of the functions set out in section 5 of 
the Police Act. Therefore, the question was whether 
the wrongs committed by him could at all be said to be 
done within the 'course and scope of his employment'. 
Where the servant acts for his own interest, his 
intention must be considered-this is a subjective 
test. However where there is a "sufficiently close 
link between the servant's acts for his own interests 
and purposes and 
master may yet be 
test. " 35 
the business of 
liable. This 
his master, the 
is an objective 
Here the court relied on the test laid down in Feldman 
(Pty) Limited v Mall 36 where it was held : 
35 Op cit 134. 
36 1945 AD 733 at 741. 
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" a master who does his work by the hand of a servant 
creates a risk of harm to others if the servant should 
prove to be negligent or inefficient or 
untrustworthy ... because he has created this risk for 
his own ends he is under a duty to ensure that no one 
is injured by the servant's improper conduct or 
negligence in carrying on his work ... " 
By approaching the problem whether the policeman's 
acts were done "within the course and scope of his 
employment" from the angle of the creation of risk, 
the emphasis shifted from the precise nature of his 
intention and the precise nature of the link between 
his acts and police work, to the dominant question 
whether these acts fall within the risk created by the 
state. By appointing Van der Westhuizen as a member 
of the Force, and thus clothing him with all the 
powers involved, the state, according to the judge, 
created a risk of harm to others, viz the risk that 
Van der Westhuizen could be untrustworthy. He could 
abuse or misuse those powers for his own purposes or 
otherwise, by way of unjustified arrest, excess of 
force constituting assault and unfounded prosecution. 
The judge found that Van der Westhuizen's acts fell 
within this purview and in the light of the actual 
events it was evident that his appointment was 
conducive to the wrongs committed. 37 The appeal was 
37 Op cit 134. 
17 
dismissed. 
In his dissenting judgment Van Heerden JA found that 
the policeman did not act in furtherance of his 
employer's business, holding 
" Although he professed to exercise police functions, 
he never intended to act on behalf of his employer or 
in furtherance of the latter's business. Hence the 
wrongs were capricious and independent acts for which 
the appellant cannot be held liable. In principle Van 
der Westhuizen's conduct cannot be distinguished from 
that of a policeman who professes to arrest a female 
victim for the alleged perpetration of an offence with 
the certain knowledge that she is innocent and with 
the sole purpose of taking her to a secluded spot in 
order to rape her. n38 
F. The views of legal commentators on Rabie decision 
In welcoming this decision, M Stranex39 says that "it 
represents a further step in the development of the 
law relating to state liability for delicts committed 
by the police, clearly leaving behind an old 
aberration in our legal history." According to this 
writer the court has shown less dependence on. the 
intention test and moved in the direction of 'risk' 
38 Op cit 132. 
39 1986 SALJ 190. 
18 
test. It is the writer's final submission that "the 
state must accept this liability, for it created the 
initial risk and, like an insurance company, must 
accede to the claim of its insured (who presumably has 
also paid his premiums by means of income tax) ." 40 
Also applauding this Appellate Division case, J.C Van 
der Walt41 suggests that the risk principle should be 
wide enough to operate as a 
vicarious liability. According 
general 
to him, 
basis for 
delictual 
liability, based on the risk principle, should consist 
of the following three elements 
(a) the considerable increase of the element of harm; 
(b) the increase of the probability of serious 
prejudice and 
(c) the unequal relationship between the actor and 
the prejudiced person. 
In a bid to substantiate the third element, this 
writer explains the nature of the risk principle. 
According to him the application of the principle to 
the state is justified by the following factors : the 
considerably wide authority, the supporting state 
machinery, the drastic violation of the prejudiced 
person's interests and the relative defencelessness of 
the prejudiced person. 
40 Supra, at 195. 
41 1988 (51) THRHR 515 at 517. 
19 
G. Case law after the Rabie decision. 
Rabie's case has been referred to in four recent 
decisions of the Appellate Division : 
In Tshabalala v Lekoa City Council 42 the court was 
concerned with the unlawful shooting of the plaintiff 
by a municipal policeman. The court found that the 
policeman was armed with his official firearm, and 
although the policeman was off duty at the time and in 
private clothes, there was a strong inference that he 
had purported, in threatening to arrest the appellant 
and firing a shot into the air, to perform his duties 
as a policeman and had intended to perform them. 
The court, per Grosskopf J .A, concluded that the 
wrongdoer had acted in the course and scope of his 
duties as a servant of the respondent. In this case 
it appears as if the court relied on the subjective 
test, referred to in the Rabie case. 
In another case of Minister van Wet en Orde v Wilson 
en 'n Ander43 the court, per Van Heerden J .A, in 
referring to the "sufficiently close link" test laid 
down in the Rabie case, said the following 
42 1992 (3) S.A. 21 (A). 
43 1992 (3) S .A. 920 (A) . 
20 
"Dit kom my dus voor dat selfs by 'n toepassing van 
die Rabie-maatstaf die verband tussen onregmatige 
benadeling deur 'n polisiebeampte vir sy eie 
doeleindes, maar met aanwending van sy bevoegdhede, en 
die risikoskepping so skraal kan wees dat die staat 
nie middelike aanspreeklikheid oploop nie." 44 
In this case the court found that the minister could 
not be held liable, in view of the fact that the 
policeman's conduct was too far removed from the risk 
created by his appointment as a police officer. 
In the case of Macala v Town Council of Maokeng45 the 
court found that in attributing liability to the state 
for a delict committed by a policeman, the cardinal 
question is whether the policeman was acting in the 
course and scope of his employment. "In order to find 
that he had so acted, his acts must have some 
connection with police work, (whether subjectively or 
objectively viewed)... and it follows that the 
creation of the risk principle is directly related to 
the enquiry as such." 
The case of Rabie was distinguished in the case of 
Minister of Law and Order v. Ngobo. 46 
44 Op cit 927. 
45 1993 (1) S.A. 434 (A) at 441 of the report. 
46 1992 (4) SA 822 (A) . 
This was the 
21 
case where plaintiff's deceased son was shot and 
killed, whilst involved in a street altercation with 
two off-duty police constables who were in plain 
clothes at the time. The ground on which Rabie's case 
was distinguish was that unlike Van der Westhuizen the 
two policemen at no stage, genuinely or ostensibly 
acted as such or exercised any official function. 
In Kumleben J .A's view, 47 the reasoning behind the 
'creation of risk' principle is open to criticism in 
the following respects : 
(i) the general principle is acknowledged to the 
extent that it is said that there must be a 
'sufficiently close link' between the acts of the 
servant in his own interests and the business of 
his master. It is accepted in Rabie's judgment 
that Vander Westhuizen's purpose was totally self 
serving and mala fide. 
(ii) It is also implied in the creation of risk 
principle that the standard test as laid down in 
our case law has reference to 'deviation cases' 
and is to be restricted to them. Should the 
standard test be accepted as the appropriate one 
for cases in which at the relevant time the 
servant had deviated from the course of his 
47 Op cit 830 and 831. 
22 
regular employment, it follows that this test 
applies ad eudem, i.e more pertinently where the 
servant cannot be said to have deviated for the 
reason that he was not even remotely engaged in 
his master's affairs at any relevant stage prior 
to the commission of the delict and any claim on 
his part to have been thus employed at the time 
of the wrong is no more than a subterfuge. 
(iii) The extract from Feldman's case at 741 is 
cited in support of the 'creation of risk' 
principle to be a 'more apposite approach' to be 
applied in preference to the standard test. In 
this regard, Kumleben J.A agrees with the 
comment in the minority judgment namely, that 
the 'emphasis falls on the employee's improper 
conduct or negligence in carrying out his 
employer's work ... ' 
(iv) In the concluding paragraph the 'dominant 
question' is said to be whether the acts fall 
within the risk created by the state. As there 
was no genuine link between Vander Westhuizen's 
acts and his police work, and no real intention 
to carry out such duties, the 'creation of risk' 
would appear to be the sole basis on which 
vicarious liability could be said to arise from 
Vander Westhuizen's misconduct. 
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Kumleben J.A concluded by saying that in so far as 
Rabie's case may be said to have replaced the standard 
test (whether the policeman was engaged in police 
business) with one based on risk, the case was wrongly 
decided. 
H. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
Act 200 of 1993 
Firstly, section 4 of the Act provides that the 
Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic and 
any law or Act inconsistent with s provisions, shall 
(unless otherwise provided for expressly or by 
necessary implication in the Constitution) be of no 
force and effect to the extent of the inconsistency. 
Secondly section 11(2) provides that no person shall 
be subjected to torture of any kind, whether physical, 
mental or emotional, nor shall any person be subjected 
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment. 
The action by Van der Westhuizen in the Rabie case 
falls within the definition of degrading and inhuman 
treatment. 48 
48 In the case of Denmark et al v Greece (3321-3167; 3344 167 YB 12 bis) 
it was stated that the notion of inhuman treatment covers at least 
such treatment as deliberately causing severe suffering/ mental or 
physical/ which in the particular situation is unjustifiable. In 
Wiechert v Federal Republic of Germany (1404 162 (D 15 15) the 
European Commission of Human Rights found that securing a prisoner 
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Section 24 of the constitution provides that every 
person is entittled to administrative justice. 
In terms of sub-section(d) every person has the right 
to administrative action, which is justifiable in 
relation to the reasons given for it, where any of his 
or her rights are affected or threatened. It cannot 
be said that Van der Westhuizen's actions were 
justifiable, with the result that his action was 
invalid at administrative law. Since the result of 
his action cannot be undone, it is apparent that some 
other form of redress is required, and here one should 
look to the state for compensation for the unlawful 
arrest, detention and prosecution. 49 
The rights mentioned above, and indeed all the rights 
included in Chapter 3 may be limited by section 33(a), 
provided the limitation is reasonable, justifiable in 
an open and democratic society based on freedom and 
equality and does not negate the essential content of 
the right. In my opinion none of the rights infringed 
in the Rabie case are affected by this section. 
by fastening one hand and one foot in the same handcuffs while he 
was being transported from one place to another constituted inhuman 
treatment. 
49 See in this regard Minister of Law and Order v Hurley 1986 (3) SA 
568 (A) in which the court examined the words "reason to believe", 
which appeared in section 29 (now repealed) of the Internal Security 
Act 74 of 1982. The effect of this decision is that there must be an 
objective basis for the decision. 
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I. Conclusion 
In is clear from the Rabie decision that there is a 
move in the direction of the risk principle as the 
basis for vicarious liability. However, the four50 
cases which followed the Rabie decision have created 
a certain amount of confusion in legal circles. While 
the judiciary was still celebrating the birth of the 
new principle for vicarious liability-the risk 
principle-after the Rabie decision, those cases 
reverted to the application of the traditional 
standard test. The case in Ngobo was even bold enough 
to reject the risk principle on the basis that it is 
"controversial and untried." 51 This in my view 
leaves a very unsatisfactory position in the law 
relating to vicarious liability. 
Snyman52 in commenting on the Rabie decision 
indicates his distaste towards the application of the 
risk principle. In his view the principle is applied 
in the mistaken belief that the intention is the only 
form of mens rea. He, correctly in my opinion, 
suggests that mens rea in the form of negligence 
steers a middle course, and will ensure that the 
50 Tshabalala v Lekoa City Council, supra, Minister Van Wet en Orde v 
Wilson en Ander, Supra, Macala v Town Council of Maokeng, Supra and, 
Minister of Law and Order v Ngobo, Supra. 
51 Op cit 833. 
52 1993 (56) THRHR 132. See also in general Snyman CR, Criminal Law, 
2nd edition (1986) at 246. 
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court, while avoiding the unsatisfactory application 
of strict libility, will be able to serve the 
interests of public welfare by requiring the adoption 
of an objective standard of care. 
In the Rabie case mens rea53 in the form of intention 
was clearly present. Van der Westhuizen maliciously 
assaulted, arrested and detained the respondent. His 
action was clearly unreasonable and therefore unlawful 
and since the action could not be amended or altered 
on review, the alternative would be to claim 
compensation for damages suffered. However, a 
stumbling block in holding the state delictually 
liable appeared in the form of the question whether 
his acts fell within the meaning of the standard test, 
namely, acting within the scope of his employment. 
It could be argued that by appointing a person such as 
Van der Westhuizen the state has increased the 
possibility of damages occuring, and that it should be 
delictually liable for damages under these 
circumstances. 
53 See J.C Vander Walt " Die staat se aanspreeklikheid vir onregmatige 
polisie optrede" 1988 THRHR 515 at 517 where he says that there are 
three normative elements for delictual liability based on risk. 
These are : 
(a) an increase in the possibility of damage occuring; 
(b) the increase of the probability of serious prejudice and 
(c) a relationship of inequality between the perpetrator and the 
injured person. 
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On the facts of Ngobo54 case the court held that in 
applying the standard test, the appellant could not be 
held liable for the constables's wrongful act of 
shooting at the deceased. Both constables were not on 
duty and they never purported to be carrying .out any 
police function. According to the court the two 
police constables were at no stages engaged in the 
affairs of the Minister of Law and Order, their 
employer, and the only connection between their 
conduct and their employment was their use of the 
revolvers which they were authorised to retain after 
working hours. 
In my view the following words of Kumleben J .A. in 
Minister of Law and Order v Ngobo 55 clearly 
demonstrate the latest attitude of the Appellate 
Division towards the risk principle as the basis of 
vicarious liability. "To my mind the standard test 
adequately serves the interests of society by 
maintaining a balance between imputing liability 
without fault, which runs counter to general legal 
principle, and the need to make amends to an injured 
person, who might otherwise not be recompensed. 
Whilst one cannot gainsay the difficulty of applying 
the standard test in certain cases, the indeterminacy 
of the element of the proposed alternatives suggests 
54 Op cit 828. 
55 1992 (4) S .A. 822 (A). 
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that their adoption would not make the task of 
determining liability any easier. In the 
circumstances there appears to me to be no sound 
reason for replacing a generally accepted principle 
with another, which is controversial and untried". 56 
Since section 25 of the Constitution specifically sets 
out the rights of detained, arrested and accused 
persons, it is submitted that the members of the 
police force will have to be carefully chosen in order 
to minimise the number of claims against the state 
based on damages. 
the protectors of 
The police, who must be viewed as 
indiviual rights have to be 
carefully screened, trained and constantly supervised. 
In the event of a poorly trained or undisciplined 
person being recruited to the police force, there is 
no doubt that a greater possibility exists that damage 
may be occasioned to the general public. 
Finally, it is clear that in so far as the test for 
vicarious liability is concerned the Appellate 
Division in Ngobo 's case has, by reverting to the 
application of the traditional standard test, 
overruled its previous decision in the Rabie case. 
In my opinion, an uncertainty has been created in the 
law by these conflicting decisions and it is submitted 
that legislative intervention is warranted. 
56 Op cit at 833. 
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